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CONSERVATIVES AND THE CONSTABULARY: CROSS-DRESSING 
CONUNDRUMS  
Robert Reiner 
 
                                               ABSTRACT 
Purpose – To analyse the historical peculiarity of the contemporary 
British politics of policing.  
Methodology – Analysis of policy statements and debates, news 
reports, and official statistics, in the light of historical studies of the 
earlier politics of policing. 
Findings – The Conservative government’s police reform programme 
severely diminishes the resources, powers, status and independence of 
the police, reversing the Tory’s traditional unquestioning support of the 
police. The package is shown to reflect broader changes in political 
economy and culture under neoliberalism. 
Originality/Value – There has been no previous academic analysis 
bringing together the various aspects of the reform programme, 
contrasting it with previous historical understanding of the politics of 
policing, and linking it to broader contemporary change. 
 
Keywords: Policing; politics; neoliberalism; political economy. 
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                                            INTRODUCTION 
 
Some fifty years ago the eminent political sociologist Seymour Martin 
Lipset wrote a paper reviewing the politics of policing. It was called 
‘Why Cops Hate Liberals and Vice Versa’, and demonstrated that the 
police tended towards the Right in their political sympathies and 
practices (Lipset, 1969). This was related to the fundamental role of 
the police, order maintenance, which involves both enforcing 
dominant standards of propriety in the streets on a routine everyday 
basis, and the ‘high policing’ function of suppressing threats to the 
political and socio-economic status quo (Brodeur, 2010).  
 
   As pointed out by Otwin Marenin, reproducing order is a Janus-
faced activity. It encompasses both the maintenance of ‘general 
order’, the preconditions of any viable social co-operation and co-
existence, which is in everyone’s interest, and ‘special order’, the 
protection of dominant elites and social hierarchy against the less 
powerful and privileged. As Marenin neatly puts it, policing involves 
both ‘parking tickets’ and class repression (Marenin, 1982). 
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   The consequence of this is that although governments in liberal 
democratic states have sought to construct a veneer of legitimacy for 
the police as politically neutral enforcers of impartial law, the ‘class 
repression’ dimension is hard to disguise especially in times of crisis. 
Right-wing partisanship often becomes blatant. It has often been 
apparent, on the one hand in more favourable treatment of police by 
conservative governments, and on the other hand, a reciprocal 
support for them manifest in individual police sympathies and in 
pressure group activity.  
 
   The puzzle addressed by this chapter is a recent reversal of this 
traditional picture in Britain, especially since the formation of a 
Conservative-led Coalition government following the 2010 General 
Election, and since the 2015 election a pure Conservative 
administration. The chapter will first document the evidence in 
Britain of a traditional special relationship between the 
Conservatives and the police, especially evident after Margaret 
Thatcher became Conservative leader in 1975. It will then outline the 
dramatic reforms of policing introduced by the Conservative-led 
Coalition after 2010, which constitute an unprecedented diminution 
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of police powers, autonomy, status, pay and resources. The 
conclusion will probe the reasons for this, and what it might tell us 
about policing under the hegemony of neo-liberalism. 
 
                             THE OLD POLITICS OF THE POLICE  
 
                        De-politicisation of the Police 1829-1970 
    
The modern police were established in the early 19th century in the 
face of widespread opposition (Reiner, 2010, Chaps. 2,3). Amongst 
other concerns many feared that the police would be a partisan tool 
of government oppression. Working-class leaders and Radicals in 
particular saw the new police as a thoroughly political military and 
spy agency, 'the minion and paid servant of the Government' (Poor 
Man's Guardian, 11 October 1830, p. 3).  
 
   In the US a key factor in legitimating the police was the notion that 
electoral democracy would prevent the domination of policing by 
elite interests, although this did nothing of course to prevent tyranny 
of the majority against racial, religious and other minorities (Miller, 
1999). In Britain this legitimating tactic was not available. Only the 
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upper class had the vote at the time of the creation of the 
Metropolitan Police in 1829, and the franchise only incorporated the 
middle class in 1832. By the time the skilled working class 
‘aristocracy of labour’ got the vote in 1867, the police had been 
established throughout the country by the 1856 County and Borough 
Police Act.  
 
   The strategy adopted in Britain to assuage fears about elite control 
of the police was to represent them as politically neutral, impartial 
upholders of a universalistic law that applied equally to all. The 
architects of modern British policing, Sir Robert Peel and the first 
two Metropolitan Police Commissioners Rowan and Mayne, declared 
that in the midst of acute social conflict they 'endeavoured to prevent 
the slightest practical feeling or bias, being shown or felt by the 
police . . . the force should not only be, in fact, but be believed to be 
impartial in action, and should act on principle' (cited in W. Miller, 
1999, p.12). 
 
   To implement this objective, the British police were insulated from 
direct political control, and national and local government police 
authorities tended to abstain from interventions in operational 
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policy. During the 1920s, this discreet stance hardened into a strict 
legal doctrine of constabulary independence from policy guidance 
(Lustgarten, 1986). In addition, although enfranchised in 1887, police 
officers remain forbidden to join or affiliate to outside trade unions 
on the ground that this would impugn their political impartiality, 
although in 1919 a ‘company union’ the Police Federation was 
established, destroying an illegal police union. 
 
   Insistence on suppressing indications of overt political control or 
partisanship softened the initial conception of the police as a tool of 
government oppression. As an 1864 article in Chambers's Magazine 
said of the police, 'they know nothing of politics; the man in blue 
preserves his neutral tint . . . the good old cause of order is the only 
side the policeman supports' (cited in Miller, 1999, p.13). 
 
 
                                  Re-politicisation of the Police 1970-1992 
 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s policing became re-politicised, as the 
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher made tough law and order a 
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central plank of her successive General Election victories over 
Labour (Reiner, 2007, Chap.5). Conservative election manifestoes 
and campaigning castigated Labour as soft on crime and anti-police. 
During the late 1970s, in the build-up to her election victory in 1979, 
Mrs Thatcher blamed the Labour government directly for rising 
crime and disorder, pledging a ‘ring of steel’ to protect people against 
lawlessness. She promised to boost the resources and powers of the 
police to prevent and clear-up crime, and to toughen penal policy, 
reversing the softness on crime that she attributed to Labour.  
 
   The Tory’s law and order campaign was greatly helped by the 
emergence of the police as a political lobby, backing up the 
Conservative’s agenda in a series of advertisements and speeches 
(Reiner, 2010, pp. 88-91). During the 1970s the police at all levels 
became overtly involved in public debate, with much publicised 
interventions that were almost invariably on the Tory side. The 
Commissioner of Scotland Yard, Sir Robert Mark, gave the first 
speech by a police officer on national television in 1972 when he 
delivered the prestigious Dimbleby lecture, arguing that excessive 
civil liberties were hampering effective policing. The Chief Constable 
of Manchester, Sir James Anderton, made a series of highly publicized 
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statements on the supposed decline in morality that lay behind crime 
and disorder, with the police cast as the domestic missionaries 
whose firm discipline could save the nation. The Police Federation 
launched a ‘law & order’ campaign in the years running up to the 
1979 election which provided an echo chamber for Conservative 
party pronouncements. The issue was a major factor in Thatcher’s 
1979 election victory, according to polls monitoring the shifts in 
public opinion. The police were directly rewarded for their open 
support when the Conservatives implemented in full a recommended 
police pay rise as one of their first acts in office.  
 
   The party political gulf on law and order reached its widest point in 
the mid-1980s. The key conflicts were over the policing of the urban 
disorders and of the Miners’ Strike of 1984/5 (both results of the 
economic and social dislocation engendered by the Thatcher 
government’s monetarist policies), the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, and campaigns for democratic police accountability.  
 
   On all these issues Labour took a civil libertarian stance, attacking 
the Conservative government for violating the principles of the rule 
of law. Labour also attacked Conservative law and order policies for 
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being counter-productive in increasing social divisions, and 
aggravating rather than reforming the root causes of crime that lay in 
social inequality and relative deprivation. Whilst this social 
democratic analysis may have had the support of many 
criminologists (at least until the late 1970s), it was an electoral 
liability for Labour (Reiner, 2012). In the 1984 and 1987 General 
Elections the Tories attacked Labour for being ‘soft’ on crime because 
of its concerns about civil liberties, ‘permissiveness’, links with trade 
unionism (which they associated with disorder), and failure to 
develop any short-term solutions to bolster public protection. Core 
aspects of Labour’s traditional stance on crime and social order 
became electoral ‘hostages to fortune’ in the face of this onslaught 
(Downes and Morgan, 2012).  
 
   In office after 1979, the Thatcher Tories petted the police with 
special treatment saving them from the attacks on the public sector 
generally. They were exempt from the wide-ranging public 
expenditure cuts, and from the New Public Management disciplines 
that sought to achieve the ‘three E’s’ (efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy). In the face of a wave of urban riots and industrial 
militancy unprecedented in postwar Britain, public order policing 
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was militarized. There were new toys for the boys in blue: Nato 
helmets, shields, long truncheons, CS gas, plastic bullets, enhanced 
legal powers, and a ring-fencing of  ‘constabulary independence’ from 
efforts by Labour controlled local authorities to question militaristic 
policing (Reiner, 2010, pp. 85-88).  
 
                         New Labour, New Consensus 1992-2005 
 
The love affair between the Tories and the police cooled somewhat in 
the late 1980s, as public expenditure cuts and New Public 
Management began to bite on the police, and they feared a hidden 
agenda of incipient privatization. For its part Labour tried hard and 
ultimately successfully to repair broken bridges. The party's leader, 
Neil Kinnock in an interview in Police Review in 1986, said he had had 
a childhood ambition of becoming a policeman. Labour 
spokespersons assiduously attended Police Federation conferences, 
and criticized the Tories for cutting police expenditure. In March 
1990, during a critical Mid-Staffordshire by-election, Police 
Federation leaders even appeared on a Labour campaign platform.  
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   There was a gradual return to cross-party consensus on law and 
order. However this occurred largely because of broader changes in 
the Labour Party, as they adjusted to the basic framework of neo-
liberalism that had been developed by the Conservatives. The ‘New 
Labour’ that emerged in the 1990s accepted many of the policy 
changes of the Thatcher years in law and order as in other policy 
areas. This was symbolized by Tony Blair’s electorally successful 
soundbite 'Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime', a slogan 
that brilliantly encapsulated the populist punitiveness of the public 
mood with a double dose of the iconic word ‘tough’, whilst still 
gesturing to the old social democratic concern about the root causes 
of crime.  Over time, however, New Labour policy increasingly 
emphasized the former in a contest in toughness between Tory home 
secretary, Michael Howard and the shadow home secretary Jack 
Straw. Labour’s conversion to the tough law and order consensus 
continued in office after its 1997 General Election victory, and 
throughout its three terms of government. During the years of New 
Labour government there was a continuous expansion of police 
numbers, resources, and legal powers (Reiner, 2007, pp. 134-5; 2010,  
Chap.7).  
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   On the other hand, New Labour was favourable to the New Public 
Management agenda initiated by the Conservatives, and in office 
implemented the ‘businesslike’ reform of police management and 
governance with at least as much rigour as the Tories (Savage, 2007, 
Chaps. 3,5). Their commitment to this was signaled early on by the 
1999 Local Government Act and its ‘Best Value’ scheme which ‘raised 
the culture of performance management to another level altogether’ 
(Savage, 2007, p. 110). The collection and analysis of performance 
indicators and the ‘league tables’ they generated became ever more 
rigorous and sophisticated (Savage, 2007).  
 
   For their part, from the late 1980s the police retreated from the 
apparent Tory partisanship they had displayed during the 
Thatcherite heyday. The prototype of the outspoken chief constable, 
Sir James Anderton, retired in 1991. He had become even more 
controversial in the late 1980s for his supposedly divinely inspired 
utterances on AIDS and other topics. By then most chief constables 
had come to believe overt police interventions in political and social 
debates were unwise. Nonetheless, the years of partisanship had 
tarnished the sacred aura carefully constructed by the architects of 
British policing whereby the police, like the Queen, were above party 
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politics. Altogether, after the early 90s the politics of British policing 
reflected the new politics of law and order. A deep underlying 
consensus on tough crime control principles, was disguised by fierce 
partisan conflict over delivery. 
 
                              Cross-dressing and the Cops 2005- 
 
Since the 2005 General Election this deep consensus on law order 
has become more complex by an increasing tendency towards 
political cross-dressing. To an extent that at times seems bizarre the 
Conservatives and Labour have swapped many of the positions they 
occupied in the 1970s and 1980s. This has become especially marked 
since the Conservatives regained office after 2010 (in Coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats until 2015). During the last period of Labour 
government, 2005-2010, the Conservative opposition began to adopt 
some of old Labour’s themes from the 1970s and 80s, including 
accusations of politicizing the police (which Labour reciprocated), 
championing civil liberties, advocating greater police accountability, 
and even flirting with a social democratic analysis of crime’s root 
causes.  
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   In 2005 the Conservatives accused the Labour government of 
inducing the Metropolitan Commissioner and other police chiefs to 
lobby Parliament in support of proposals to extend detention limits 
for terror suspects to 90 days. ‘They said that the campaign marked 
“a damaging step towards the politicisation of the police…. We need 
to ensure that the distinction is maintained between the process of 
policymaking, which is properly for the Government, and the 
enforcement of law, which is properly for police.”’ (‘Ministers 
dragged police into politics, say Tories’  The Times November 11 
2005). Accusations of politicising the police from the Tories came 
again after the November 2008 arrest and detention of Damian 
Green, the Shadow Immigration Minister, during an investigation into 
leaked government documents. The resignation of Sir Ian Blair as 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner on 2 October 2008 prompted an 
orgy of accusations that the new Conservative London Mayor Boris 
Johnson was politicising the police. ‘What is important when you are 
both choosing and when you're supporting somebody that you're 
asking to do a job like that is that you keep party politics out of it’ 
said the then Home Secretary Jacquie Smith. Johnson’s predecessor 
as Mayor, Labour’s Ken Livingstone, claimed: ‘This makes the role of 
 15 
the Metropolitan Police Commissioner much more political’ (Daily 
Telegraph 3 October 2008).  
 
   The defeat of the Labour government’s proposals in 2008 to 
introduce direct elections to police authorities aroused a storm of 
mutual accusations of politicising the police. ‘Proposals for direct 
elections to police authorities have been scrapped after the Home 
Secretary caved in to growing concerns about the politicisation of the 
police…  Ms Smith blamed concerns from senior officers…, and then 
accused the Conservatives of fuelling worries over politicisation…  
Shadow Home Secretary Dominic Grieve said: "The danger of 
politicisation of the police comes from the micro-management that 
has been the hallmark of the Labour government.“’ (Daily Telegraph 
December 18 2008). The ‘micro-management’ that Grieve 
complained about was in fact the continuation by Labour of the 
‘businesslike’ New Public Management approach pioneered by the 
Conservatives.  
 
   These episodes indicate an orgy of political cross-dressing when 
considered in terms of the previous positions of the parties on these 
issues. Throughout the 1970s and 80s Labour accused the 
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Conservatives of politicising the police for their own partisan 
advantage. Local democratic accountability was then seen as a left-
Labour issue, opposed by the Conservatives. In 2005 the Tories 
advocated election of local police chiefs, but Labour hit back with its 
own proposals to strengthen local accountability only to be accused 
in turn of politicising policing. The 90-day detention debate saw the 
Tories donning the civil libertarian mantle that had been one of 
Labour’s electoral ‘hostages to fortune’ in the 1980s.  
 
   The Conservatives also flirted with another of old Labour’s 
‘hostages to fortune’, the social democratic root cause theory of 
crime. This figured most prominently in David Cameron’s 2006 ‘hug-
a-hoodie’ speech, ‘calling for more understanding of “hoodies” and 
criticising what he calls short-term solutions to curb youth crime 
such as anti-social behaviour orders and curfews. In a ground-
breaking speech calling for more “love” to be shown to adolescents, 
the Tory leader will attack bans on hooded tops - a symbol of urban 
menace to many adults - …  arguing that shrouding their faces is a 
response to children's own fear of crime against them, not a crime in 
itself. He will try to reposition his party as tough on the causes of 
crime, urging a greater focus on the family and on the social 
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influences driving children to offend… Cameron will tell a conference 
on social justice tomorrow that politicians should be discussing 
causes of crime not its symptoms’ (‘Cameron softens crime image in 
“hug a hoodie” call’ The Observer 9 July 2006 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jul/09/conservatives.u
kcrime accessed 29 November 2015). 
 
   After the 2008 financial crisis, the Conservatives blamed Labour 
government economic policies when the statistics briefly indicated 
that crime was beginning to rise in response to the credit crunch (as 
forecast by Home Office analyses). The Labour Home Secretary 
Jacquie Smith responded with an assertion of solely individual 
responsibility for crime that echoed Margaret Thatcher’s rhetoric of 
the 1980s. ‘I don’t think there’s any justification just because it’s a 
difficult economic time for someone to commit a burglary. I’m not the 
sort of person who thinks these things are inevitable.’ (‘Britain 
unprepared for recession crime wave, opposition claims’ The 
Independent 23 January 2009).  
 
   This dizzying policy and rhetorical cross-dressing was in large part 
motivated by each party’s grappling with the deep fears engendered 
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by long years in the political wilderness, Labour from 1979 to 1997, 
the Tories from 1997 to 2010. After becoming respectively Leader of 
the Opposition and Shadow Home Secretary in 2005, David Cameron 
and Theresa May were concerned to decontaminate what May called 
the Tory brand as ‘the nasty party’. Some of this survived after the 
Conservative led Coalition took office following the 2010 General 
Election, with the adoption of revolutionary reforms of policing.  
 
   Since losing office in 2010 Labour, still haunted by its electorally 
damaging ‘hostages to fortune’ of the 1980s, has continued the cross-
dressing by attacking the Conservative led Coalition’s reforms with 
old Tory tunes, such as civil liberties being supposedly antithetical to 
effective policing. For example, two former Labour Home Secretaries 
Alan Johnson & Charles Clarke accused the Coalition of soft-on-crime 
liberalism. They claimed that the Tories’ ‘conventional law-and-order 
stance was sacrificed to the civil libertarians. They questioned the 
use of CCTV, removed suspected murderers and rapists from the 
DNA database and replaced control orders with a watered-down 
system that has led to the current dangerous situation where 
suspected terrorists who can't be deported or tried, are free to walk 
the streets of our cities’ (Johnson, J and Clarke, C., 2014).  
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                                                Coalition and the Cops 
 
The Conservative-led Coalition’s policing policies embody a profound 
rupture in the politics of policing. The Conservatives have been 
tougher on the police than any ‘old’ Labour government would ever 
dare to be. This is a much deeper change than just applying to the 
police the general public expenditure cuts being implemented in the 
name of ‘austerity’, unlike the Thatcher era special case treatment of 
the police budget. There has been a much broader assault on police 
autonomy and powers. Relations with the police, the Tories’ 
erstwhile pets, are at an all-time low.  
 
   Launching the reforms, Home secretary Theresa May declared ‘This 
paper signals the most radical change to policing in 50 years’  
(Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting police and the people Cm 
7925, July 2010: 3). For once a Minister’s claims are too modest! ‘50 
years’ refers back to the Police Act 1964, which important as it was, 
primarily consolidated existing arrangements for police governance. 
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The Coalition programme, for good or bad, mounts a revolutionary 
assault on the traditions that had developed over 150 years. 
 
   Partly this is a question of money. The police have been amongst 
the hardest hit of all public services in the Coalition spending cuts 
(although on November 25th 2015 Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne backtracked from a similar planned cut between 
2015-2020, because of public concerns in the wake of the Paris terror 
attacks two weeks previously). ‘In the October 2010 spending 
review, the Government announced that central funding to the police 
service in England and Wales would be reduced in real terms by 20% 
in the four years between March 2011 and March 2015…  Forces plan 
to achieve… 73% of the savings by cutting the total police 
workforce…  by 31,600 (13%) between March 2010 and March 2015. 
This comprises: 15,400 police officers; 13,400 police staff; and 2,900 
PCSOs.  Forces’ plans show that 95% of these planned workforce 
reductions for the whole spending review period should already have 
been made by March 2014’ (HMIC, 2013, pp. 14-16).  
 
   The government claims its cuts will not threaten police 
performance and public safety because they are accompanied by 
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fundamental reforms of pay, conditions of service, management, and 
governance that eliminate inefficiencies, and incentivize the police to 
produce more from less (embodied largely in the Winsor Reports: 
Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and 
Conditions HMSO 2011-2). Much of this had its roots in the New 
Public Management and other initiatives since the late 1980s 
(notably the 1993 Sheehy Report), but Winsor is Sheehy on steroids.   
Unsurprisingly, the cuts provoked fierce criticism from many police 
quarters (‘Coalition's cuts to police budgets “risking public safety”’ 
Daily Telegraph 2 December 2012; ‘Police Federation, the coppers' 
union, falls foul of the Conservative party’ The Guardian 14 February 
2014). Defending the decision to impose similar cuts in the 2015-
2020 Parliament (called off because of the Paris terror attacks), 
Theresa May made much of the falling crime rate despite the police 
cuts, accusing the police of crying wolf.  
 
Even more profound than the dramatic cuts and transformation of 
police conditions of service and management is the revolution in 
governance. The Coalition accountability model, enshrined in the 
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, at first glance 
appears to achieve the old Labour ambition of subjecting police to 
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elected control, defying the erstwhile Conservative apprehensions 
about politicization. But first impressions may be deceptive.  
 
A central pillar of the Coalition government rhetoric presenting the 
reforms is that they achieve democratic policing. Theresa May 
referred to them as ‘the most significant democratic reform of 
policing in our lifetime’ (May, 2012). The claim rests on the election 
of local Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), who are given 
formidable powers, placing them in pole position in the new 
governance structure. The other elements are the Home Secretary, 
the Chief Constables, and the Police and Crime Panels (a concession 
to the Conservatives’ Coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats). The 
Police and Crime Panels are selected in a similar way to the old police 
authorities the new structure has replaced, but with an explicitly 
advisory, not even nominally powerful, role ‘Constabulary 
independence’ formally preserved  (Policing Protocol Order 2011), 
although many see threats to the doctrine, given the PCCs powers to 
hire and fire Chief Constables (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee Police and Crime Commissioners: power to remove Chief 
Constables 2013).  
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   The Coalition (and now the Conservative) government have also 
promoted important reforms of the most contentious police power, 
stop and search (Delsol and Shiner, 2015). The changes are 
particularly due to Theresa May and the HMIC (reservations have 
been expressed by David Cameron). She announced on July 8 2010 
that s. 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, empowering officers to stop and 
search anyone in a designated area without having to show 
reasonable suspicion, was suspended. This followed a January ruling 
by the European Court of Human Rights that the powers were 
unlawful because too broadly drawn and lacked sufficient safeguards 
to protect civil liberties. Labour had tried to challenge this, but 
Theresa May accepted the judgement (an example of the cross-
dressing discussed above). Following Home Office deliberations, 
Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order March 2011 was issued. It 
tightened the procedure and criteria for declaring an area as 
designated. However, ‘suspicionless’ stop and search is still possible 
in absence of reasonable suspicion in such areas, although the actual 
use of the power has plummeted.  Against this significant diminution 
of police power, recording requirements for making the process 
accountable have been reduced. 
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   Unsurprisingly, the government has sought to present its reforms 
as a success. So too has Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC), now headed by Tom Winsor. Winsor not only is the author of 
many of the reforms but also personally embodies the changes, being 
the first civilian to become HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary in the 
century and a half of the Inspectorate’s history. Although sounding 
some cautionary notes, the HMIC evaluation of the impact of the cuts 
echoes the government’s assessment. Its presentation of its findings 
accentuates the positive nuggets of good news, downplaying the bad. 
For example, the planned increase in the proportion of the workforce 
on the ‘frontline’ is highlighted over the fact that this nonetheless 
means an absolute reduction (HMIC 2013: 16). The ‘frontline’ is 
defined simply as ‘crime-fighting’ in the same paragraph, even 
though many, probably most, calls for service and police operations 
concern emergencies not reducible to crime-fighting (Reiner, 2010, 
pp. 141-7). The whole report is framed as a response to ‘austerity’, 
which is treated as an inevitable act of God rather than a contentious 
policy choice (Blyth, 2013; Stuckler and Basu, 2013; Seymour, 2014), 
and to which there are cogent alternatives (Krugman, 2012; Stiglitz, 
2013).  
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   There is a rapidly growing critical literature on the Coalition’s 
policing project (eg Jones et al, 2012; Lister, 2013, 2014; Reiner, 
2013; Turner 2014). A judicious critique, accepting the validity of 
some measures, but questioning others, is provided by the Report of 
the Independent Police Commission chaired by former Met 
Commissioner Lord Stevens, established but not controlled by the 
Labour Party (Stevens, 2013), and the wide-ranging volume of essays 
prepared as evidence for it (Brown, 2014).  
 
   What is beyond doubt is that the Coalition’s package, love it or loath 
it, amounts to a dramatic weakening of police power, autonomy, pay, 
and conditions of service. The purpose of this chapter is not to add to 
the burgeoning literature, indicated previously, assessing the virtues 
and vices of the reforms, but to probe why this has happened at the 
hands of the Tory Party, formerly the avid paramour of the police, 
and why now.  
 
                    Explaining Coalition/Conservative Cop Reforms 
 
What is beyond doubt is that the Coalition’s package, love it or loathe 
it, amounts to a dramatic weakening of police power, autonomy, pay, 
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and conditions of service. The purpose of this chapter is not to add to 
the burgeoning literature, indicated previously, assessing the virtues 
and vices of the reforms, but to probe why this has happened at the 
hands of the Tory Party, formerly the avid paramour of the police, 
and why now.  
 
    The programme, self-billed as ‘the most radical change to policing 
in 50 years’, was not proposed because of a law and order crisis.  
Recorded crime has been falling for two decades; and there is not 
even a hint in government statements of any special emergency, or 
failing on the part of the police, only that things could always be 
improved. The main justification offered is principled rather than 
pragmatic: to reverse the shift in power over policing from central 
government to  ‘the people’, an aspect of the more general localism 
agenda rather than anything specific to criminal justice (Home Office, 
2010, pp.1-4). 
 
Many Labour and Liberal politicians, and a bevy of criminologists, 
lawyers, and civil rights activists have been criticising the growing 
democratic deficit in police governance, especially at local level, for 
the best part of the last century. It is the Conservatives who hitherto 
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obstructed reform, in the name of the doctrine of constabulary 
independence, which was consolidated by a 1930 court case, Fisher v. 
Oldham, not coincidentally as radical Labour local authorities were 
beginning to be elected. Why this sudden political cross-dressing? 
Why now? 
 
   Probably so revolutionary a package is happening under the Tories 
because it could only happen under the Tories, the ‘Nixon in China’ 
principle. If a Labour government had attempted anything as radical 
it would have been vulnerable to attack as soft on crime but tough on 
the police, charges that would have been electorally damaging and 
probably fatally so. Indeed the demand for local democratic 
accountability of policing was one of Labour’s electoral ‘hostages to 
fortune’ of the 1980s (Downes and Morgan, 2012). For all the efforts 
of Tony Blair and his successors, Labour has never managed to 
supplant the Tories as the party of ‘law and order’ in popular 
sentiment, even when it has been more supportive of the police than 
the Tories.  
 
   But why do the Tories want this programme? And how is there the 
political space for them to get away with it? What has happened to 
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the cultural capital of the police? Why does the complaint of police 
spokespersons that cutting cops is Christmas for crooks no longer 
carry the clout it used to? 
 
   At one level the slashing police resources is congruent with a larger 
agenda, dating back to the Thatcher government and derived from a 
broader libertarian perspective, of cutting back the state as much as 
possible.This only received lip service in the Thatcher era, because 
the police were treated as a special case, exempt from the pressures 
of achieving efficiency, effectiveness and economy that were being 
applied to the rest of the public sector. In small part this may have 
been for sentimental reasons  
 
   The main factor protecting the police in the 1980s, however, was 
the pivotal role played by them in bringing to heel trade unionism, 
especially during the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike. Police powers, resources 
and morale were also crucial in handling the urban disorders 
resulting from the unemployment and deprivation generated by 
monetarist economic policies.  
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   During the early 1990s politically edged public disorder receded, 
and the focus of law and order switched to ordinary crime. Here the 
special case treatment given the police had not paid off. Recorded 
crime (and British Crime Survey measured victimization) rose to 
historical highs, as noted by several Ministers in John Major’s 
Cabinet.  
 
   This was the context for the application of ever more stringent 
financial accountability and New Public Management techniques, 
which continued under New Labour from 1997-2010. 
 Throughout this period, increasing police expenditure and numbers 
remained totemic proof of Labour’s commitment to be tough on 
crime, and indeed they have consistently opposed the Coalition cuts.  
 
   For reasons that remain debated, from the mid-1990s recorded 
crime fell consistently, throughout the Western world (Reiner 2016: 
Chap. 7). The most convincing explanation is the ‘security 
hypothesis’: the adoption of much more effective physical and 
situational crime prevention (Farrell et al., 2014), which was a 
universal trend whilst policing and penal policy varied between 
different jurisdictions. The part played in the crime drop by policing 
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is questionable, but it certainly helped satisfy performance targets 
and took pressure off the remorseless demand for more police. 
 
   The decline in crime and political/industrial disorder thus reduced 
the demand for policing - the police may have done their job too well. 
Although opinion surveys suggest most people believe crime has 
continued to rise overall, despite the contrary statistical evidence, 
they do not feel this about their own neighbourhoods or through 
personal experience, as they did in the 1980s and early 90s.  
At the same time, anxiety about crime and disorder remains, albeit 
less acute, because of a widespread recognition that the fundamental 
drivers of criminality have been suppressed (but not alleviated) by 
better crime prevention. Law and order has slipped down the list of 
public anxieties as expressed in opinion polls, and it played scarcely 
any part in the British General Elections of 2010 and 2015. 
 
   Beneath the trends in crime an even deeper change in the political 
economy and culture of British society underlies the transformation 
of the policing landscape. This is the rise of neoliberal hegemony over 
the last four decades, remorselessly eliminating any space for 
alternatives to free market economics and its culture of narcissistic 
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individualism, which has been strengthened rather than weakened 
by such apparent shocks as the post-2008 economic crisis (Mirowski, 
2013; Gamble, 2014; Streeck, 2014).  
 
   The consequences for crime, criminal justice and policing are 
profound. The key link between neoliberal political economy and 
policing is the growth of massively greater inequality (Reiner, 2007).  
The Gini coefficient, the most common measure of overall income 
inequality, fell to an all-time low of just under 27 in 1979, but shot up 
during the Thatcher government to a high of 37 in 1990. It fell again 
to 33 in the Major and early Blair years, before shooting back to 37 at 
the turn of the millennium. It has fluctuated around 33 ever since.  
Even more striking is the trend for the richest 10%, who are moving 
qualitatively away from the rest of society. The share of income going 
to the top 10% of the population fell over the first 40 years since 
World War II, from 34.6% in 1938 to 21% in 1979, while the share 
going to the bottom 10% rose slightly. Since the embedding of 
neoliberalism after 1979 the share of the top 10% has returned to 
nearly 32%, almost touching pre-war levels 
(http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/about-inequality/scale-and-trends 
accessed 27 February 2014). 
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   The growth of inequality generates problems of order that the 
police must deal with. Econometric studies show that increasing 
inequality is directly linked with a growth of expenditure on policing 
overall (Jayadev and Bowles, 2006; Rikagos and Ergul, 2011, 2013; 
Bowles and Jayadev, 2014), and within that a shift from public police 
to private security. In so far as the crime drop of recent years is 
attributable primarily to better physical security that is mainly 
purchased privately, this too is related to inequality. Although all 
sections of society have benefitted from the crime reduction, there is 
evidence it has disproportionately advantaged the wealthy who can 
pay for more and better security (Tilley et al., 2011).  
 
   In terms of theoretical analysis of the police function, the balance 
between general and particular order is shifting. The rise of the 
publicly provided police in the early 19th century was part of a 
modernist project of constructing a broadly universal order based on 
a common status of citizenship in which all shared, albeit unequally 
(Reiner, 2010, Chaps 2,3). Given the survival of some inequality the 
order reproduced was simultaneously general and particular, but 
over time the former became more significant, until the late 1970s. 
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Overt inequality in the delivery of policing services was seen as 
illegitimate, although it has always survived.  
 
   It is significant that the creation of the modern police was opposed 
not only by the working class, who were not yet incorporated into 
citizenship, but also by the elite. The aristocracy and gentry saw state 
policing as an unnecessary expense. The ruling class was protected 
from the ‘dangerous classes’ by physical segregation and private 
retainers (Silver, 1967).  
 
   Analysts of the growth of private security have long seen this as 
threatening a return to pre-modern policing forms, a ‘new feudalism’ 
(Shearing and Stenning, 1983; Zedner, 2006), suggesting a dystopian 
vision in which the privileged float free, cocooned from the masses in 
security bubbles (Davis, 1990). These Blade Runner nightmares are 
not here yet, but the massive increases in inequality and the cutbacks 
in public provision of all services, including policing, point in that 
direction.  
 
   The bottom line politically permitting the Conservative police 
reforms is that the powerful are simply less dependent on public 
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police protection, benefitting from bespoke services that are cheaper 
than extending universal guardianship to all citizens. Neoliberal 
theorists have long argued that only a ‘night watchman’ state can be 
justified as a call on taxation that would receive universal assent 
(Nozick, 1973). But this overlooks the degree of redistributive benefit 
in publically financed policing. In the present conjuncture the police 
are being rolled back with the rest of the state, and privatization, 
with no mandate for the public good, flourishes.  
 
                                                     CONCLUSION 
 
   At present there seems little tangible prospect of reversing the 
trajectory towards extreme social and economic polarization. In the 
words of Arundhati Roy, ‘while the elite pursue their voyages to their 
imaginary destination, some place at the top of the world, the poor 
have been caught in a spiral of crime and chaos’ (cited in Bauman, 
2005, p.2). However, this dystopian path cannot continue forever 
without generating a reaction, hopefully restoring the more benign 
march of justice and inclusive citizenship that underlay the 
legitimation of the British police in their first 150 years. The ancient 
Latin insight ‘if you seek peace, prepare justice’ retains its validity 
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and wisdom, above all for those charged with developing policing 
policy.  As the T-shirts of protestors against police shootings in 
Ferguson and elsewhere declare, ‘No Justice, No Peace’. 
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